a handful of people appointed for life and not (professionally or politically) accountable to anyone, the power to prevail over the decisions of the democratically elected Congress and state legislatures? Considering the enormous resources we spend on maintaining the democratic process, it seems utterly puzzling that we are willing to put the outcome of this process at the mercy of an unelected institution that is not democratically accountable.
Most supporters of constitutionalism in the U.S. tell us that it is precisely the nondemocratic nature of the Court -its detachment from representative democratic procedures -that warrants the current constitutional structure. What we need, we are told by supporters of constitutionalism, is precisely this counter-majoritarian element in the system, in order to curtail, at least to some extent, the political and legal power of the majoritarian decision procedures that are instantiated by the democratic legislative institutions. In other words, and simply put, the idea is that constitutional judicial review is needed as a countermeasure to ordinary democratic procedures, as a limit on majority rule. I am not suggesting that this is the only rationale on offer justifying the current U.S. system of constitutional judicial review. But it is the one that I will consider in this paper.
There are, of course, various ways to push back on the counter-majoritarian rationale of constitutionalism, depending on the putative purpose of the limit on majority rule that is envisioned. 3 For example, if the idea is that majority rule needs to be limited in order to protect the rights of persistent vulnerable minorities, it would be fair to ask whether constitutional judicial review actually manages to accomplish the task. Or if the putative purpose of the limit on majority rule is to curtail the power of the central or federal government, it would be fair to ask whether a differently structured democratic system would not accomplish the task better. Or if the idea is that we need to limit majority rule in order to secure greater political equality of some sort, then the question arises why differently structured electoral system would not do a better job in that respect.
My aim in this paper, however, is to avoid these particular debates about the rationale of constitutionalism. My doubts about particular rationales of these sorts I expressed elsewhere. 4 Here I want to begin with realities of constitutional judicial review, as they actually paly out in the US constitutional system, and show that there is very little difference between the current structure of constitutional review in the U.S. and a system that would impose limits on majoritarian decision procedures by an entirely randomized mechanism. Showing that may not amount to a conclusive argument against judicial review, far from it, but I hope it will give us some pause.
1.
Imagine that we could construct the following system: Instead of a constitutional court or supreme court with constitutional judicial review, we design a randomized system of judicial review. Here is how it might work (hypothetically, of course): Every new law enacted by the legislature is automatically submitted to the "judicial review computer." Similarly, every constitutional challenge to a governmental policy or practice is filed with the same computer system (instead of the courts). Let us assume that a panel of lawyers feeds the computer with the set of possible legal outcomes of each challenge.
Normally the set would be either pass or fail constitutional muster, but sometimes it could be a bit more complex, perhaps dividing the challenge to several options. As a simplifying assumption for now, we will postulate that the set of outcome options is both very limited in scope and fairly technical. 5 Then, at the end of the year, the computer runs a program that yields a totally random selection of "cases" that it strikes down as "unconstitutional" and therefore legally invalid. How many of them? Well, we can easily determine some formula in advance, say, a certain number of cases based on factual parameters gleaned from the history of judicial review in the last century or so 6 -or any such mechanical, but essentially randomized, method. Let me call this the Randomized 4 See my Interpretation and Legal Theory, revised 2nd ed, chapter 9, and Law in the Age of Pluralism, chapter 5 I realize that this is a very simplified assumption and that it ignores familiar problems of agenda settings and framing effects. However, there is no need to worry about it too much in the present context, as we will see in the sequel, a modified version of the hypothetical (that will be called RJR*) avoids these problems. 6 We would not want the formula to pick out a certain percentage of challenges because there may not be a check on the number of such challenges filed. A fixed number of decisions on "unconstitutionality" would be more sensible.
Judicial Review process, or RJR, in contrast with the actual Constitutional Judicial Review system we have, which I will henceforth label as CJR.
Obviously, the RJR system would have to be a bit more sophisticated and complex for it to be plausible, even as a hypothetical. For one thing, we would need some initial screening procedures. For another, we would need some process, judicial or other, to determine some basic factual findings that would be needed to ground the constitutional challenges. Both of these issues can be resolved, however, without insurmountable difficulties. We can imagine a system whereby lower courts would have to certify constitutional challenges, and determine their factual groundings, before they can be filed with the randomizing computer.
So here is the question I would like to pursue in this essay: How would RJR differ, in significant moral-political ways, from CJR? I will try to show that between the hypothetical RJR and the actual CJR the differences are rather insignificant, morally speaking, and, in any case, provide no good reasons to prefer the actual to the hypothetical. At this point you might think that the issue is moot because there is absolutely nothing to support a randomized process of judicial review; it is just too crazy.
Well, crazy it might be, but two considerations lend it some support: First, just like the current CJR, it puts a limit on majority rule. It curtails, to the same extent, at least quantitatively (ex hypothesis), the majority's ability to enact laws or implement policies by a regular majority vote. Second, a consideration of fairness may count in favor of a purely randomized system. When you have a winner and a loser in a legal battle, and neither side is obviously right or wrong (more on this later), a randomized decision procedure gives each side an equal chance of success or failure. In any case, it is not my argument to recommend RJR. The argument is to show that compared with RJR, CJR is not really superior -not by much, anyway.
Before we proceed, an obvious objection needs to be answered. Surely, people would think, it matters what the constitution says. After all, there is a written constitution, with some determinate legal content, and it is the constitutional text and its legal content that judges need to implement by their decisions. Cases ought to be determined by the legal content of the constitutional text (and perhaps well-entrenched constitutional doctrines and precedents). Therefore, the argument would go, the main difference between RJR and CJR consists in the fact that RJR is totally insensitive to the legal prescriptions embodied in the Constitution, whereas CJR is guided by the constitutional text, even if imperfectly so. Let me call this the obvious objection.
It is difficult to answer the obvious objection in the abstract. The extent to which the content of constitutional documents actually guides constitutional decisions of courts varies a great deal between different jurisdictions. I will confine myself here to the U.S. It is difficult to separate the data on constitutional certiorari; overall, the U.S. Supreme Court gets about 9,000 to 10,000 petitions a year and grants cert to about 100 cases. 10 It may be worth keeping in mind that differences in decisions between Circuit Courts of Appeal constitute one of the main reasons for the Supreme Court to grant cert; thus, many of the constitutional cases heard before the Supreme Court have a history of split decisions in lower-level appellate federal courts. 11 I should not protest too much if all this sounds like a superficial recount of ideas floated almost a century ago by the American Legal Realists. I am not endorsing their view wholesale, far from it. My comments above are confined to constitutional cases that make it to the U.S. Supreme Court. For reasons I have explained elsewhere in detail (The Language of Law), the reality in ordinary cases of statutory interpretation is very different. But that is not our concern here. The obvious objection may have a point, however, when you think about the legal impact of the constitutional text in those cases that do not make it to appellate courts, because the legal content of the Constitution is just clear enough to determine particular outcomes. In other words, supporters of CJR could claim that, even if my previous argument is correct, and easy constitutional cases do not make it to the Supreme Court, countless legal issues are determined by the Constitution simply because it is clear enough what the Constitution mandates or requires. That, of course, is quite true. The constitutional text, and probably even more so, the well-entrenched constitutional doctrines and precedents, make a significant legal difference in countless cases in which the legal content of the constitutional law is not in any serious doubt.
However, we can easily accommodate this concern by revising the hypothetical structure of RJR. Instead of assuming that all constitutional challenges are automatically submitted to the randomizing computer, we can confine the randomization mechanism to those cases that do make it to appellate courts, under the current CJR system, and fail to muster unanimous decision at the appellate level. 12 The idea here involves a great simplification. It would take the unanimity of the decision by the appellate court as a proxy for cases in which the constitutional text, and perhaps deeply entrenched constitutional doctrines, are clear enough to determine particular results. And then, failure of unanimous consent on a constitutional case would be taken as an indication of some plausible controversy. Randomization would kick in, according to this revised system, only in cases of some actual legal controversy at the appellate courts level. Let us call the revised system RJR*. As I said, the use of unanimity at the appellate courts or the Supreme Court level should not be taken to be more than a simplifying assumption. It should be seen as a proxy for drawing the line between cases in which no serious legal doubt about the constitutional legal content can be raised, and those in which some plausible legal argument can be made to decide the case one way rather than another. It is not a perfect proxy, for sure, but good enough to make the argument here. Therefore, if you take the obvious objection to have a point, just think about RJR* instead of the original scheme; assume that randomization kicks in only in those cases in which there is 12 And perhaps when there is a split in the decisions of circuit courts on the same constitutional matter.
some actual doubt about constitutional requirements. That would still cover the vast majority of cases that make it to the Supreme Court under the current CJR.
2.
Having answered the obvious objection only takes us so far. We need to consider more serious objections to RJR. In what follows, I will consider four main arguments purporting to show the superiority of CJR: the argument from public perception, the argument based on the rule of law, the argument from incentives and the social consensus argument. I will try to show that none of these arguments provides a compelling reason to prefer CJR over RJR.
Let me begin with the problem of public perception: I would not deny the allegation that RJR is not going to be popular with the general public. People would find it very difficult to accept, as a matter of political legitimacy, any system of constitutional review that is so overtly random and, thus, arbitrary. We would like to think that the boundaries of political legitimacy are not set by a computer program that strikes down, randomly, some democratic decisions as legally invalid. In short, it is difficult to imagine that anything like an RJR system would be socially and politically acceptable. And, of course, I am not claiming that it is a realistic, feasible scheme that can be implemented.
But the question is whether this is a serious worry in the dialectical context of the argument, and I do not quite see how it would be, for two main reasons: First and foremost, because the point of the thought experiment I suggest here is not to convince us that we could actually replace our constitutional law with something like RJR. Since the argument is not based on the actual feasibility of RJR, the fact that it would be unlikely to be accepted by the public is neither here nor there. The second problem is that the publicperception argument does not go very deep. It does not give us any substantive reasons to prefer CJR over RJR, apart from the fact that CJR looks better, so to speak. Looking morally better does not make something morally better; it just makes it easier to live with it. And the fact that something is generally accepted by the public, as U.S.
constitutionalism undeniably is, is not really an argument in its favor. One should always keep in mind that many things that are widely accepted by the public, even for a very long time, can turn out to be wrong and morally misguided. To conclude: The fact that RJR cannot be publically accepted is not going to tell us why CJR is preferable to RJR.
Perhaps a more serious objection to RJR can be drawn from the ideal of the rule of law. The rule of law means a lot of different things to different people, but at least we all share the view that it purports to capture the idea that it is good to be governed by law.
I would not want to deny that this is a commendable ideal and that governance should always be subject to law and constrained by it. 13 The question is why would RJR violate question that goes to the heart of the justification of constitutional judicial review. So once again, just assuming that CJR is preferable to RJR on grounds of the right to hearing, is putting the cart in front of the horse in the dialectics of this argument. If and to the extent that CJR is preferable to RJR, then people's right to have their day in court is one that should be respected. I don't see how one can justify the rationale of having a judicial, as opposed to a democratic decision, on the grounds that one has the right to present one's arguments. Arguments can be presented in a democratic process just as well. What calls for justification here is the exception to democratic procedures, namely, the removal of a decision from it and handing it to the courts, and I fail to see how we can justify this removal by appealing to a right to hearing. First we need to show that there is a justification for removing a certain decision from the ordinary democratic processes by handing them to a court, and then we can talk about the right to hearing and its proper implementation.
Perhaps the most plausible concern about the rule of law with RJR is the concern about fair warning: Presumably the idea is that, under a system of RJR, legislatures and the law's subjects would have no way of knowing in advance which laws and regulations might be struck down as unconstitutional and thus legally invalid. 
3.
Let me turn to the third main problem with the hypothetical system of RJR, namely, that it does not guarantee any form of compliance with constitutional principles, whatever we take them to be. The main problem with the argument under consideration consists in its underlying assumption that legislators necessarily want to avoid constitutional challenges to their legislative acts. The assumption is that, if legislators know in advance that a piece of legislation they seek to enact is likely to be struck down as unconstitutional, they would refrain from trying to enact it. But that is just not necessarily, or even typically, the case; scholars have long pointed out that legislators often go ahead with an act they expect to be struck down as unconstitutional because it gives them the populist political benefit vis-à-vis their constituents without actually bearing the responsibility for the unwanted consequences of the proposed legislation. 19 Here is a schematic scenario:
Suppose that there is strong popular support for a legal measure, say X, to be enacted.
Suppose that X is a questionable measure from a constitutional perspective, one that might be struck down by the Supreme Court. If the legislators believe that voting for X is going to be popular with their constituents, even if they share the qualms about the desirability of X and/or its constitutionality, they would act rationally if they go ahead and enact X. If X is struck down by the Supreme Court, the legislators gain the popularity benefit from their constituency supporting X, while shifting responsibility for the measure's failure to the Court. If the Court upholds X, the legislators get both the popularity benefit and the legal-moral support of the Court, a kind of vindication that X is not unconstitutional after all. Either way, voting for X is a win-win situation from the legislators' perspective.
The general lesson from this is simple: Unconstitutionality does not necessarily operate as a sanction; it does not necessarily deter legislatures from enacting questionable the responsibility to the Court. Therefore, CJR does not typically induce constitutionally responsible behavior; often it does the exact opposite.
Of course, supporters of CJR may claim that such distorted incentives are the exception, not the rule. Most of the time, they would say, CJR provides the right incentives; it only fails to do so under some specific set of circumstances that are rather exceptional. But I seriously doubt that this optimistic view is also realistic. Remember that we could easily shift the argument from RJR to RJR*: If the unconstitutionality of a proposed piece of legislation is entirely on the surface, in no plausible legal doubt, legislatures would not have the political incentive to go ahead with the legislation. It is difficult to gain political traction with measures that are obviously and transparently unconstitutional. Populist pressure tends to build up around measures that seem constitutional to some, though not to others. Legislators tend to push for enactments that they can present as passing constitutional muster with some, even if strained, plausibility. to see what setback to politicians' interests is in play here. If the constitutionality of the measure they seek to enact is in some doubt, why would they refrain from forging ahead?
There might be one type of case in which even a vague and uncertain threat of unconstitutionality provides some incentive to back down, namely, when the relevant measure forms part of a policy change the executive branches of the government seek to implement, and its obstruction by the Court would constitute a serious impediment to the implementation of the policy. In such cases, the looming threat of unconstitutionality should provide the government with an incentive to avoid the threat and modify its proposed policy accordingly. One should think that this would be the case particularly with policy changes that involve heavy costs. But, even then, it turns out to be difficult to generalize. The executive branches of government are not free of populist temptations.
They may also have an incentive to take the risk of obstruction or even failure of the policy they wish to implement if they can blame it on the courts, particularly when the policy in question is very popular with the ruling party's constituency.
20
To sum up the argument from incentives, the main problem with the argument in favor of CJR is that unconstitutionality does not necessarily operate like the threat of a sanction that could deter political actors from succumbing to populist temptations. On the contrary, the more populist the temptation for a legislative act, the less likely that CJR's presumed deterrent effect would have any real impact. In terms of incentive structures, there is no advantage to CJR over RJR*.
4.
The intuitive appeal of the argument I try to articulate here crucially depends on the premise that a very significant random element is already present in the current system of CJR. Constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court reflect a certain distribution of ideologies espoused by justices on the Court at any given point in time;
furthermore, given the appointment procedures and especially the justices' unlimited tenure on the Court, the particular distribution of moral, political and religious views on the Court is not necessarily representative of the views held by the general population.
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Now, of course, supporters of CJR would claim that this is as it should be. After all, if the whole point of CJR is to act as a counterbalance to majority rule, curtailing the populist 20 A good recent example, though technically a legislative product, comes from the Affordable Care Act... The administration and Democratic legislators were fully aware of the fact that a crucial aspect of the law, where constitutional challenge could have been easily avoided by labeling the mandate to purchase insurance as a federal tax, and yet the opted for a much more problematic formulation and only for political reasons. 21 As a striking reminder, consider the fact that all the current justices on the U. to the decision of a swing voter on the Court, the justice who tends to be the ideological independent, so to speak. That does not seem to be anti-majoritarian in the right way; it is anti-majoritarian in a random way, depending on historical circumstances, such as which justice was appointed by whom, when and how long the justice hangs on to his or her job on the Court.
If we want to find some serious considerations that support the idea that the Court's nondemocratic character constitutes some anti-majoritarian limit on democratic procedures in the right way, we need to look at deeper structural factors. We need to look at the kind of constraints that the Supreme Court, as an institution, is likely to impose on majority rule regardless of its momentary, accidental, personal composition. Some rough and vague generalizations are possible; it is generally true that courts tend to be relatively conservative institutions. They tend to reflect elitist world views. Courts typically avoid extreme positions on most social and moral issues and, crucially, they tend not to fall too far out of line with the views and dispositions of the median voters in the country. Courts tend to remain within fairly secure boundaries of social consensus, not statistically and accurately so, for sure, but roughly and generally. 23 That is so mostly because their power base is social acquiescence, not brute force. Courts gain all the power they have from the perception of the population that the power they exercise is legitimate. They cannot act, 23 The very high likelihood that the US Supreme Court, conservative as it is, is expected to uphold a constitutional right to same-sex marriages later this year is a striking example of the point I make in the text. It shows how justices are willing to sacrifice even deeply held religious and moral conviction in the service of the court's long term social legitimacy.
at least for the long run, in ways that would antagonize their power base, which is, essentially, popular acquiescence in their legitimacy.
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So where does all this lead? Well, it leads to the idea, a kind of reassurance, that, even if there is something random and arbitrary in the outcomes of constitutional cases of the Supreme Court, at least the boundaries are relatively secure. The chits are unlikely to fall far out of line with the national-cultural consensus. Let us suppose that this piece of armchair political science is true. The problem is that it would not support a good
argument. If what makes CJR non-majoritarian in the right way is based on the premise that CJR is likely to reflect social-cultural consensus, at least generally and in the long run, as it were, then why do we need it to begin with? It would seem that we lost the underlying rationale of CJR, which is to put some limits on majority rule. Surely the ordinary democratic processes reflect social consensus with greater accuracy than the courts. In short, if the main justification for preferring CJR over RJR rests on the assumption that constitutional decisions are likely to reflect social consensus, the need for any form of constitutional judicial review is cast in serious doubt. Democratic legislative processes tend to do a much better job in that; they tend to be much more attuned to social and cultural trends in society than the courts.
By way of conclusion, let me emphasize again that the argument in this paper is not meant to provide an overall assessment of the arguments for and against constitutional judicial review. It is only meant to suggest that the counter-majoritarian rationale of CJR is seriously wanting. The current system of CJR is fraught with arbitrary elements, to an extent that makes the system only marginally better, if at all, compared with an overtly and blatantly randomized system. As I warned from the start, this is not a conclusive argument against CJR, but it should give us some pause.
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24 This is evident in cases of national emergencies, when courts tend to rally to the flag as quickly and as unreflectively as everybody else in the country. Perhaps you might think that the infamous Lochner era is a counter-example. To some extent it is, of course, but not entirely. First, keep in mind that the Court's rulings in this period represented the deeply entrenched ideology of the capitalist elite in the U.S.; it was not out of touch with social realities. Secondly, bear in mind that the Lochner era lasted only a couple of decades, eventually succumbing to the progressive movements that came to dominate U.S. political reality. 25 I am grateful to Leticia Morales, Alex Sarch, and the participants of the legal theory workshop at McGill University, for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
